Anecdotal evidence suggests that clout and connections matter more in private equity fundraising than actual performance. In this paper, a unique real estate private equity 
Introduction
Due to low correlation with traditional asset classes, real estate private equity (REPE) funds, i.e. nonlisted closed-end funds investing with a value-added or opportunistic approach in real estate, are increasingly favored by plan sponsors to gain real estate exposure outside of their home markets [Baum and Farrelly, 2009] . In many cases, the legal structure or a very limited secondary market hinder plan sponsors from rescaling or withdrawing their equity commitments during the lifetime of a fund. As a result, their capital is locked into the fund for several years and is only freed upon its liquidation. Due to this long-term commitment, careful selection of funds and fund managers may be of even greater importance for REPE than for investments offering a quick exit option. Our study sets out to investigate whether fund managers can benefit from structural factors such as capital under management, size of previously issued funds or a central position within the REPE industry when raising new funds, or if simply performance matters.
The REPE industry experienced dramatic growth before and after the crisis, with real estate private equity funds now playing an important role in the asset allocation of plan sponsors around the world.
Just in the six years from 2009q1 to 2014q4, USD 375 billion of institutional capital was committed to 1,321 REPE funds [Preqin, 2015] . However, despite constant growth the industry's playing field is unequal. In 2014, the ten largest REPE funds alone secured approximately 40% of all capital commitments that year, while many medium and small size firms faced difficulties raising money for their funds [Lee, 2015] . When studying fundraising statistics from recent years, it becomes apparent that 2014 was not a unique year.
With ever-larger funds, the biggest fund managers have been racing away from their smaller competitors. By far not the oldest player in the business, the Blackstone Group, as the industry leader, manages about as much capital as the second, Lone Star Funds, and third, Goldman Sachs, largest REPE managers together, or more than 200 times as much capital as the median fund manager [see Exhibit 1 for metrics of the 30 biggest fund managers in the sample]. Today's market structure and super-sized REPE funds might not be good for the industry overall.
Aligned investment activities can lead to mispricing, decreased diversification ability and increased risk, e.g. through unpredictable returns, irrespective of fund size and manager skills [Baur, 2006; Chiang and Zheng, 2010] . Our study sets out to investigate drivers of REPE fundraising success and in particular, we aim to address the issue of whether fundraising success stems from previous established business relations with plan sponsors, or if simply performance matters. While the former would benefit wellconnected managers, thus leading to accelerated growth, the latter situation would provide more equal chances for well-performing managers to raise follow-on funds.
Previous research on real estate private equity in a broad sense, i.e. including core and open ended funds, has focused mainly on drivers and the persistence of REPE fund performance. The established evidence suggests that the performance of REPE funds stems mainly from the performance of the underlying real estate market [e.g. Alcock, Baum, Colley and Steiner, 2013; Fuerst, Lim and Matysiak, 2014] and that (net-of-fee) market out-performance of REPE managers is, at most, a short term phenomenon [e.g. Hahn, Geltner and Gerardo-Lietz, 2005; Bond and Mitchell, 2010] and that fund performance declines with the sequence number of the fund [Tomperi, 2010] . In other words, past 
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performance is not a reliable guide for selecting fund managers in this industry. Moreover, Martí and Balboa [2007] argue that it takes some three to five years after closing to invest the capital committed to a private equity fund and that returns only materialize several years later. Hence, when raising capital for the next fund, performance figures for previous ones might not yet be available. As a result -and in accordance with the signaling theory -the size of previous funds and the total capital under management serve as de facto proxies for company reputation and the ability to manage large amounts of capital. This means big funds attract capital simply on account of their size. Further, media attention increases in line with fund size, which could lead to lower search costs for the investor and, in turn, higher capital commitments [e.g. Sirri and Tufano, 1998 ].
Moreover, investment decisions are based on long-standing trust relationships between plan sponsors and fund managers (which stem from personal relationships and familiarity; not from past performance) and fund managers can exploit sunk costs for searching, underwriting, and familiarity through charging above average fees, even in a competitive fee-bargaining environment [Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny, 2015] . This led Hahn et al. [2005] to question whether the demand side of this market is behaving in an economically rational manner. Lastly, increasing concentration might be fuelled by herding behavior, which in the past occurred mainly during phases of high market volatility and/or market downturns [Philippas et. al., 2013; Zhou and Anderson, 2013] . This naive strategy of mimicking the investment decisions of peers, lowers search costs and allows the decision maker to 'share the blame' in cases where the chosen fund underperforms or even loses money [e.g. Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Jenkinson, Jones, and Martinez, 2014] . Uneducated investment decisions which occur while herding, can also lead to biased expectations about potential risks and returns [Hwang and Salomon, 2004] .
To find out the reasons behind the observed concentration, we could conduct a survey of plan sponsors asking about their motives for investing in a particular fund. However, this approach might be plagued by the stated preference problem, i.e. investors may not reveal their true motives or could even not be fully aware of them. Instead, in this paper we apply network analysis techniques to measure the 'embeddedness' of a fund manager in the relationship context and then use the calculated metrics to predict fund-raising success. We use the term 'plan sponsor' for institutional investors, such as pension funds, retirement systems, sovereign wealth funds, etc. to distinguish them clearly from fund issuing private equity companies that invest the fund's capital in property. We use the term plan sponsor interchangeably with limited partner (LP), where the latter describes the legal status in the fund structure. We refer to fund managers, REPE firms, and general partners (GPs) as firms that raise capital from plan sponsors. Once the equity commitments have reached the target size, the fundraising process is closed; the GP subsequently invests and manages the capital on behalf of the plan sponsors.
Sample Construction
As a basis for our analysis, we merged previously unconnected buy-side and sell-side data from the Preqin real estate database. Based on 14,720 equity commitments (participations), we established links between 2,216 plan sponsors investing with 837 fund managers in 2,717 REPE funds (see Exhibit 3).
Subsequently, we incorporated party and fund specific data into the system.
Exhibit 1: Number of firms and connections in the dataset
The resulting REPE network has global coverage and spans from 1969q1 to 2015q1 (cut-off period).
Among other things, the system allows us to identify subsequent funds (same GP, later year of fund issuance ('vintage')), subsequent participation (same LP, later vintage) and LP-GP business relationships, directionally measured through LP participation in funds issued by GPs (same GP, same LP). Additionally, we can track and measure the intensity of reoccurring business relations through subsequent participation (same LP, same GP, later vintage). In order to compare fund performance across different investment strategies, geographies, points in the market cycles etc., we use relative performance measures instead of the equity multiples or the net-of-fee internal rate of return (net-IRR).
That is, we employ the excess-IRR, which is the deviation of a fund's net-IRR performance from its In further data exploration we checked the performance of 'Big funds' which are the 30 biggest funds in our dataset. All of them have a size of 4,000 USD million or bigger. 'Big managers' are defined as the 
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F ull sample five biggest fund managers in the dataset, measured by total capital under management at the time of data retrieval. Subsequent funds are all funds that a manager issued after the first fund, i.e. funds with serial number 2 or higher. All performance figures are equal-weighted and are not adjusted for fund-size.
Exhibit 2: Relative fund performance
Network analysis to calculate industry embeddedness
The reputation of an REPE fund can be measured in several ways. In addition to the relative performance measures excess-IRR and quartile ranking of the previous fund, we assume that the size of the previous fund itself and the total amount of capital under management at the time of fundraising has a signaling effect towards plan sponsors. In addition to these observable factors, we use network analysis techniques to identify how many equity commitments from plan sponsors a fund manager can secure in each year a fund is closed. We assume that when a plan sponsor participates in a fund a business relation between the fund issuing manager and the plan sponsor is established and that the fund manager will try to use this connection when raising capital for the next fund. We assume further that managers with more participants in their funds, i.e. more connections to plan sponsors, are more centrally located (embedded) in the REPE industry and that this centrality can be measured through the total amount of plan sponsor connections in each vintage year.
Originating in graph theory and network analysis, centrality measures are frequently used in epidemic research to examine the spreading of viral and bacterial diseases. They have also been applied in computer science (e.g. Google PageRank) and more recently, in social science, for example to examine the dissemination of information in social (media) networks.
We deploy centrality measures as proxies for the embeddedness of a fund company, because we suspect that without having the need of a 'cold call', better connected fund managers might also be more The (in-)degree centrality is a simple count of the known participation that a GP can secure in each vintage year and the eigenvector centrality measure weights this participation additionally according to the centrality of the investing plan sponsor. This is calculated as
where A GPLP is the adjacency matrix, i.e. A GPLP = 1, if GP and LP have a connection through participation in a fund, and A GPLP = 0 otherwise. The eigenvector centrality takes continuous values from 0 to 1, with 1 given to the most central GP. This measure weights the participation edge by the centrality of the participating LP. It is therefore useful for investigating the herding behavior of smaller LPs who follow the participation decision of big plan sponsors, assuming that they undertook thorough due-diligence and that their decision to participate is an indicator for the quality of a fund.
In addition to the degree centrality and eigenvector centrality measure, we include the size of the previous fund, the size of the fund manager (measured by total capital under management at the time of fundraising), as well as the relative performance measures excess-IRR and quartile ranking from the previous fund in our model. This allows us to gain a deeper understanding of the drivers leading to fundraising success. As proxy for fund raising speed or 'density' we use the average number of days that a fund manager needs to collect one million US-Dollars for a respective fund. We calculate this by dividing the fund size at closing with the number of days from fundraising start date to the closing date.
For funds dominated by foreign currencies and where USD equivalents were not provided, we calculated the USD amount with the respective exchange rate from the closing date. With the average days as depended variable we built the following regression model
where LnFundSize if-1 is the log of size from the previously issued fund, Rel.Perform if-1 is the excess-IRR (regression set I) or quartile performance ranking (regression set II) respectively. DgrCntr if-1 is the above described degree centrality measure for that the fund manager gained through issuing the previous fund.
EgnVctrCntr if-1 is the GP's eigenvector centrality measure from the previous vintage year. Lastly, LnGPsize if-1 is the GP's amount of REPE capital under management, i.e. cumulated sum of previous REPE funds. As the quartile ranking is a categorical representation of the excess-IRR, we run the regressions individually including only one of the relative performance measures in the same set of regressions. Having in mind that the volume of the previous fund (f-1) is included in the size for the GP and that we calculated two centrality measures based on the same network, several tests for multicollinearity were conducted. We found the variance inflation factors and the variance-covariance matrix for the estimated coefficients to be in acceptable ranges.
Results
The regression output can be seen in Exhibit 6. The upper 
Conclusion
In this paper, we apply network analysis methodology to first find out which fund managers are well connected and deeply embedded within the real estate private equity industry and consecutively, to investigate whether the managers can benefit from their connections to plan sponsors when raising capital for new funds. In order to do this, we matched previously unconnected REPE-investor, -fund, and -manager data and created a global industry network for each year. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to apply network analysis methods in the context of real estate private equity research.
Given the early stages of this research, a number of caveats are in order. In particular, the relatively low predictive power of the regression estimates is a concern, but it is in a range comparable to similar studies. In follow-up research, we will seek to enhance the model with additional variables so as to improve the predictive power of the identifying equation. Notwithstanding the limitations, our results do not confirm findings of previous research suggesting a positive relationship between fund performance and subsequent fund size [e.g. Tomperi, 2010] . Analyzed individually, the embeddedness of a fund manager (measured by degree centrality and eigenvector centrality) enables him to raise capital for follow-on funds faster. However, in the full model specification with size and relative performance measures, the significance of this embeddedness vanishes. In this setting, the only remaining significant predictors for fundraising speed are the size of previous fund and the fund manager's total amount of capital under management. To put it crudely, being well-connected helps but sheer size seems to trump all other factors, at least for raising new real estate private equity funds more quickly.
